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To achieve carbon neutrality, the Portuguese government put in place a battery electric vehicle 
(BEV) subsidization program. By focusing on the non-additionality concept, we show that the 
percentage of BEVs buyers who would have bought them without the subsidy is smaller for 
low income households (more price sensitive) than for other households and corporations 
(27,43% vs 29,99%). Moreover, the welfare positive consequences for consumers are greater 
when targeting low income households, given that there are more marginal consumers who will 
be able to purchase a BEV. This results in lower CO2 emissions and increasing positive 
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Climate change fight is way far from being over and as Winston Churchill said in times of 
War: “Now this is not the end. It is not even the beginning of the end. But it is perhaps, the end 
of the beginning.”.  
1. Introduction 
In the last decades the world has been witnessing the effects of mankind’s technological 
evolution, followed by massive production and consumption. This progress enhanced countries 
to achieve fast economic growth, as major examples China and India, with relevant 
improvement of economic standards. The population has grown exponentially, from 2.6 billion 
in 1950 to current 7.8 billion, while the expectations are that by 2100, the number will reach 
the 11 billion mark (United Nations, 2020).  
Hand in hand with such societal transformation there are the hazardous consequences to the 
environment and to the survival of the planet. According to the PBL Netherlands Environmental 
Assessment Agency 2019 Report, in 2018 the global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions were 
57% higher than in 1990. This massive increase, with considerable annual growth rates, 
contributed to the rise of global temperatures, and 9 out of the top 10 warmest years occurred 
since 2005 (records started in 1880). 
The abovementioned negative environmental impacts have placed climate change and 
sustainable development in the core of the international political agenda. The increasing 
awareness that the measures implemented so far were not strong enough, have encouraged the 
197 Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) to 
adopt the Paris Agreement. The treaty establishes that global temperatures rise should be kept 
well below 2 degrees Celsius when compared to pre-industrial levels and provides the 
framework to guide nations in their paths to achieve the goal to carbon neutrality by 2050. Even 





agreement, it was broadly accepted by the 197 nations. However, the doubts concerning the 
effectiveness of the signatures rose rapidly. With Greta Thunberg in the lead and with the motto 
that there is no planet B, younger generations demand effective and timely actions from 
politicians and corporations. 
With the aim of complying, not only with the Paris Agreement, but also with citizens’ 
requests, the European Union is the frontline of that battle, having approved the European Green 
Deal in the end of 2019. One of the focus of this European Agreement is on transportation 
(Communication European Commission 2019). It represented 28% of the total EU’s carbon 
emissions in 2018, with cars as the mean of transportation which contributed the most, 
representing 43% of the total (Transport & Environment, 2020). In this context, electrification 
of the economies, in general, and of transportation, in particular, plays an important role, taking 
advantage of the significant increase in the production of electricity from renewable energy 
sources. Hence, several European countries have created incentives to decarbonize their 
citizens’ fleet, promoting electric vehicles. So, the aim of this project is to contribute to the 
discussion about the Portuguese electric vehicle incentive’s program, so that the goal of carbon 
neutrality can be achieved in the most cost-effective way. 
The effect in sales may be somehow correlated with these incentives, with a promising 7.8% 
share of electric vehicles in the EU 27 countries for the first half of 2020 (Transport & 
Environment, 2020). Their consequences to the Portuguese electric vehicles sales were the base 
ground to develop this work project.   
The main results, both analytical and graphical, are supported by simulations which based 
on a constant price elasticity demand function and a linear supply function. Battery electric 
vehicles’ buyers were divided in two groups: low income households and high-income 





and by equating the two functions a market equilibrium was obtained. In a second step, it was 
defined a 3-unit subsidy amount that was incorporated in the demand function by substituting 
the demanded price (Pb) by the seller price (Ps) minus 3. After equating this new demand with 
the supply function, we reached the equilibrium prices and quantities with the subsidy. From 
these values it was possible to calculate non-additionality percentages, which represent the 
portion of buyers who would have acquired a 100% electric vehicle regardless of the existence 
of the subsidy.  Low income households, with a more elastic demand, presented the lowest 
percentage, 27,43%, compared to the 29,99% obtained by the high-income households and 
corporations. Although, this difference is almost insignificant, it supports the message that it is 
more cost-effective to subsidize more price sensitive buyers, given that there will be more 
marginal consumers who will be able to buy a battery electric vehicle.  
Moreover, using a graphical analysis with the above mentioned price and quantity’s values, 
with and without the subsidy, it is assessed that by subsidizing more inelastic consumers, the 
government is reducing the equilibrium price for buyers whose willingness to pay (WTP) is 
larger than the initial market price and so would not need the grant to buy these vehicles. On 
top of this the decrease in equilibrium prices with the subsidies is larger for this group when 
compared with low income households. Due to this, the positive externalities, which arise from 
additional battery electric vehicles purchases, will be reduced when targeting less price 
sensitive demands and will not compensate as much as expected the deadweight loss created 
by the subsidy.  
The above findings translate that without any further requirements, the current Portuguese 
subsidy scheme is not cost-effective. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 a literature review is 





effectiveness. The Portuguese Electric Vehicles Incentives will be detail, followed by 
interesting results from a survey exclusively created for this final thesis. Then, a theoretical 
framework with the most important concepts will be presented, complemented by different, 
previously mentioned, simulations to evaluate possible answers to the research question. 
Finally, there will be time to acknowledge important conclusions from the results obtained and 
to provide some policy recommendations.  
2. Literature Review 
Electric vehicles (EVs) can be divided in 5 different categories:  Battery Electric Vehicles 
(BEVs), Plug-In Hybrid Electric Vehicles (PHEVs), Hybrid Electric Vehicles (HEVs), 
Extended Range Electric Vehicles (EREVs), and Fuel Cell Electric Vehicle (FCEVs). For the 
purpose of this work project and literature analysis only the first three are relevant. The BEVs 
are 100% electric vehicles, with electric motors and batteries recharged in any electric power 
source. These are the focus of the most recent Portuguese incentive program. The PHEVs use 
both an electric motor (supported by rechargeable batteries) and a gas engine in its driving. 
These two categories are usually grouped into one single definition: Plug-In Electric Vehicles 
(PEV). Finally, the HEV are models similar to PHEV, however, do not have the possibility of 
recharging their electric batteries. In this case, the electric motor complements an internal 
combustion engine for fuel efficiency purposes (Current EV, 2019). 
As stated before in the introductory section, the market and the sales for PEVs is growing 
at a promising rate and China is one of the biggest contributors. Wang et al. (2017) provide a 
broad picture of the Chinese market, explaining how the country was able, not only to surpass 
the US sales, but also to make them grow 343% from 2014 to 2015. The authors present the 
numbers for the massive monetary incentives granted. However, they report that the 





ownership) was the most relevant incentive for consumers to purchase a PEV. Finally, the 
authors mention that there is unsustainability related to these incentives and that more cost-
effective policies must be introduced.  
  Chandra et al. (2010) evaluate the hypothesis whether the tax rebates, provided to HEV 
new purchases, were cost effective in environmental terms. The data corresponded to all the 
Canadian provinces between 1986 and 2006 and the first major conclusion was that a $1000 
tax rebate incentive would increase, on average, the share of HEV sold by about 34%. Although 
this result could be considered to be positive, the authors show, through a counterfactual 
analysis, that the incentives were encouraging not only consumers that would buy HEV 
regardless of the existence of the tax rebate, but also consumers that are more prone to drive 
more fuel efficient cars (known as non-additionality). All together $195 was the cost per tonne 
of carbon saved, way above the price of carbon in the market. Similar results were presented 
by Azarafshar et al. (2020) for the period 2012 to 2016, and for PEV, instead of HEV.  
Sheldon et al. (2019) go one step further and instead of only evaluating the cost 
effectiveness of PEV subsidies they analyse which subgroup of consumers should be targeted. 
Their results demonstrate that when focusing on consumer heterogeneity, 85 to 95% of the 
subsidy budget is directed to people who would not purchase a PEV without this support. 
Moreover, the share of total sales attributed to the subsidy would rise from 17 to 30%. Their 
recommendation is that a policy with the aim of increasing the share of PEV sold should target 
low income consumers. Davis (2018) also points out that the incentive policies should 
encourage the best fitted groups, so that not only the share of PEV increases but the 
environmental benefits are greater. Since a subsidy or a tax credit do not take into account 
whether EV consumers drive more or less miles, a carbon tax would be a better solution to 





Alongside with the idea of evaluating subsidies’ cost effectiveness, Xing et al. (2019) link 
every EV model to a proper substitute counterpart (consumer second choice). The authors 
contributed with valuable insights regarding the connection between price elasticities of 
demand and their impact in the share of consumers that would have bought EVs regardless the 
availability of the subsidy (non-additionality). Their paper and theoretical concepts were the 
major contribution to the development of this work project and in a later section will be detailed 
and properly defined.  
Moving to the European market, Yan (2018) considers an internal combustion engine (ICE) 
model as a substitute to different BEV models, and evaluates whether there are positive savings 
in switching from the former to the latter in 28 European countries. Taking the example of 
Portugal, the author concludes that in 2014 BEVs were 4434€ more expensive than an ICE 
model. Moreover, the author also estimates an increase of 3% on average in the market share 
of BEV sales with a 10% increase in tax incentives. One significant contribution for a broad 
and detailed European analysis of the effect of different incentives, both monetary and non-
monetary in the market share of PEV, was performed by Munzel et al. (2019). Based on a panel 
data for the 32 larger countries, the authors find a 5,4% average increase in PEVs’ sales share 
for a 1000€ increase in financial incentives. 
2.1 Consumer behaviour and willingness to pay  
Focusing on consumer targeting, Yang et al. (2019) complement the literature by analysing 
which specific groups are more prompt to be encouraged by the incentives. After conducting a 
survey on incentive adoption intention and regressing the data obtained, the authors concluded 
again that “lower income exhibit higher acceptance and interest in the policies”. A similar 
approach was conducted by Lin et al. (2018) with the relevant result that for the Chinese 





in the biggest cities (smog). They also end up obtaining similar conclusions related to 
heterogeneous consumers’ characteristics, such as gender. In both studies females are more 
willing to purchase an EV.  
When exploring the EVs’ market is important to keep in mind that the price premium for 
such models (monetary difference for a non EV counterpart) is usually high, even when 
including all the possible savings (Yan (2018). Hence, different authors have developed 
econometric models to estimate the willingness to pay for EVs’ consumers. Liu (2014) focuses 
only on HEVs data sales for the US in 2009 and acknowledges a considerable negative 
difference between the WTP (between $963 and $1718) to the price premium at the time 
(around $5000). For the author, it is clear that the amount of the subsidies granted should take 
into account this discrepancy. A similar conclusion was reached by Discroll et al. (2013) 
according to which only a non-realistic $50 000 grant would be enough to meet the 10% HEV 
market share. Concerning the BEVs’ case specifically, Breetz et al. (2018) claim that it may not 
be reasonable to continue to subsidize them due to their high purchasing price and lack of 
competitiveness (Nissan Leaf model would require more than $10 000 in incentives to become 
competitive). Moreover, in Ayetor (2020), about Ghana’s government incentive proposal of 
exempting the payment of import levy, only second handed electric vehicles, with at least 3 
years of usage, could become competitive with non-EVs models. 
Noel et al. (2019) brought this willingness to pay question into the European context, more 
specifically to the 5 Nordic countries.  However, the research was not only focused on the car 
itself, but also on consumers WTP for each characteristic (for example acceleration and driving 
range).  As one would predict recharging time and driving range are, among all the other 
characteristics evaluated, the ones that are statistically significant in all countries with an 





kilometre considering driving range. Again, these results cannot be ignored when designing a 
cost-effective subsidy policy. 
2.2  Broader policy recommendations and review conclusion 
Matthews et al. (2017) provide an interesting approach to increase EVs’ adoption. While 
focusing on dealerships in Ontario, Canada, their survey findings suggest that once a 
salesperson is well trained to demonstrate a positive attitude towards EVs, and if these models 
are frequently available on site, the chances of consumers deciding to buy them increase.  
As a final note in this literature review, it is relevant to state that questions are raised about 
the environmental benefits of PHEVs and whether they should be supported by state incentives. 
The European Federation for Transport and Environment 2020 study “A new Dieselgate in the 
making”, reflects this position, namely that PHEVs models are not as environmentally friendly 
as they are announced to be by their brands’ test results.  In a 100 kms journey for example, 
driving one of the considered models could result in around twice the amount of CO2 emissions 
when compared with brands’ official results.  
In contrast, Constestabile (2017) argues that the policy schemes should target small range 
BEVs and long-range PHEVs. By analysing more in detail the UK and California markets, in a 
long-term perspective, long range BEVs were far from being competitive and would only create 
a growing instability on the incentive’s sustainability. For the author the continuous 
development and reinforcement of long-range PHEVs would open doors for the technological 
progress in batteries, so that long-range BEVs would turn out to be a viable option. In summary, 
this review highlights that only properly designed policies, focused on buyers’ heterogenous 







2.3  EVs’ incentives in Portugal 
In this section, the different incentives in place in Portugal for 2020 are presented, dividing 
into incentives targeting households and companies. However, first, tax benefits that are 
common to both groups are detailed, and then an overview on the subsidization program general 
rules is presented. 
In Portugal cars are subject to different taxes. Two of them are the Imposto sobre Veículos 
(ISV) and Imposto Único de Circulação (IUC). The former is a one-time tax paid upon purchase 
and the latter is paid once a year. Both taxes calculations are related to CO2 emissions and 
engine cylinder capacity.  
Concerning IUC, only the BEVs are exempt given its 100% electric feature. Regarding ISV, 
BEVs are again fully exempt. PHEVs and HEVs have a 75% and 40% exemption rate 
respectively.  
Additionally, the VAT from electricity expenses related to battery charging can also be 
deductible, but only when the vehicles are charged in public chargers or the owners have an 
electricity meter exclusive to their charger, so that it can be discriminated in the electricity bill. 
Regarding the subsidies it is important to underline that, within EVs categories, they are 
only available to BEVs, up to a maximum purchase price of 62 500€ (including VAT). The 
vehicles’ categories subject to the program are divided in 4 groups: Light Passenger Vehicles; 
Light Commercial Vehicles; Electric Bicycles, Motorcycles and mopeds, Load Bicycles; and 
finally, Traditional Bicycles. The candidate is able to ask for more than one incentive, so one 
can receive a subsidy for a light passenger vehicle and for a motorcycle. This incentive scheme 







In Table 1, the subsidies’ granted by the Portuguese government to support households’ 
purchases are presented.   
 
 Households Maximum # of grants 
Light Passenger Vehicles 
3.000€ 




Light Commercial Vehicles 
3.000€ 




Electric Bicycles, Motorcycles 
and mopeds, Load Bicycles 
50%, up to a maximum of 350€  





10%, up to a maximum of 100€ 






2.3.2 Corporations  
In 2020, companies also benefited from the subsidization program. In Table 2 all the values 
for the different vehicle category are detailed.  It is relevant to point out that for light passenger 
vehicles, in comparison to households, not only the subsidy decreases to 2000€, but also the 
maximum number of grants also falls, from 700 to 300. Moreover, corporations are able to 




Source: Fundo Ambiental 2020 












In addition to the abovementioned subsidies, corporations can also take advantage of 
different fiscal incentives. 
VAT  
The VAT amount, 23% of the purchasing price, of PEVs can be fully deducted. For BEVs 
the limit price considered is 62 500€ and for PHEVs 50 000€ (both without VAT). As an 
example, a car that costs 40 000€ (including VAT) will end up costing 32 520€, almost 8 000€ 
in savings for the company.   
Depreciation and amortization concerns  
A vehicle owned by a firm can be depreciated at a maximum yearly rate of 25%. In 
accounting terms that amount is considered an expense and will then decrease previous fiscal 
year’s total profit subject to income tax. However, and like in the VAT case, there is a limit 
purchasing price that can be considered for depreciation and amortization purposes. In 
diesel/gasoline cars this amount is 27 500€ but for BEVs and PHEVs it increases to 62 500€ 
and 50 000€ respectively. 
 Corporations Maximum # of grants 
Light Passenger Vehicles 
2.000€ 




Light Commercial Vehicles 
3.000€ 




Electric Bicycles, Motorcycles 
and mopeds, Load Bicycles 
50%, up to a maximum of 350€  





10%, up to a maximum of 100€ 




Table 2: Government subsidies to corporations by vehicle category 
Source: Fundo Ambiental 2020. 









Autonomous taxation (i.e “Tributação autónoma de veículos para empresas”) 
Depreciation and expenses related to vehicles’ usage are subject to an autonomous tax, on 
top of income tax.  The rates differ depending on the purchasing price (VAT included) and 
whether the company presented profits or losses (in case of losses the tax rate increases 10 p.p). 
In summary, BEVs are exempt from paying this tax (either in profits or losses) and PHEVs pay 
around half of the tax applied to diesel/gasoline cars. Natural gas vehicles (NGV) also benefit 
for a reduction in this tax. In Table 3 the rates from this autonomous tax are detailed for the 
different vehicles categories. 
 
Vehicle Price Gasoline/Diesel PHEVs BEVs NGL 
Below 27 500€ 10% 5% 0% 7,5% 
Between 27 500€ and 35 000€ 27,5% 10% 0% 15% 
Above 35 000€ 35% 17,5% 0% 27,5% 
 
 
3. Battery Electric Vehicles’ Survey 
A 9-question survey was created as a complement to the development of this thesis. 
Portuguese was the language used, so that it could reach, in an easier way, a larger audience.  
In Table 4 from Appendix A all the details concerning the survey questions and respective 
options are presented. 
 
 
Table 3: Autonomous taxation rates 








3.1  Survey Data and Findings 
The survey was shared for about 3 weeks, ending up with 366 people responding to the 9 
questions. On the one hand, in the figures 1 to 9 of Appendix B, we can see a percentage 
distribution for the option chosen in each question by the respondents. On the other hand, the 
same information, but in absolute values, is presented in tables 5 to 13 of Appendix C. 
The sample is somehow heterogeneous gender wise with 58% females and 42% males 
(Figure 1). From question 2, it is relevant to notice that young adults, below 35, represent 46% 
of the sample which may have a positive impact regarding environmental concerns (Figure 2). 
Focusing in monthly net income, the sample is characterized as a medium-low class sample 
with around 50% of the people earning less than 1500€ per month in net terms (Figure 3). Only 
1% (4 people) owe a BEV and the thoughts about considering buying one were split 
homogenously, with 55% answering “Yes” and 44% “No” (Figure 4). The sustainability and 
environmentally friendly aspect of a BEV is a valuable reason to 80% of the sample, while 45% 
and 59% are interested in the existence of subsidies and long-run savings respectively (Figure 
5). Regarding kms driven per day, only a residual 7 % of the sample drive on average more 
than 100 kms, which means that the majority would accommodate easily to the BEVs’ battery 
autonomy (Figure 6). Question 7’s answers send the message that the purchase price of a 100% 
electric vehicle might still be a considerable barrier to the survey participants. 51% of the 
respondents were only willing to pay up to 20 000€ (Figure 7). Considering that the cheapest 
and still less attractive models cost around 25 000€ (Guia do Automóvel, 2020), this valuation 
is far from desirable amounts.  However, there are positive signs related to what these buyers 
are willing to pay more for a BEV when comparing it to a similar ICE (in terms of the general 
characteristics). 52% would be willing to pay more than 1000€ (Figure 8). This might be 
grounded in one or more of the reasons to buy a BEV presented previously, such as long-term 





people (Figure 9) were aware of the existence of a 3000€ subsidy to acquire a BEV (if the buyer 
is a households).   
Through a Pivot Table Analysis of the data on can complement the above general 
presentation with a specific characterization of different income groups concerning willingness 
to pay.  
In Table 14 below it is represented the number of people in each income group (excluding 
students and people who preferred not to say) that are willing to pay below 25 000€. Given their 
WTP, these potential buyers would for sure not buy a BEV without any subsidy, given the high 
purchasing price nowadays. In opposition, people above the 25 000€ WTP would be potential 
candidates to acquire a BEV regardless of the incentives, making the 3 000€ households’ 
subsidy less relevant. As seen in the table, we conclude that the majority of these individuals 








As a final remark of this survey analysis, it is important to state that all the results were 




15 000 - 20 000 
Column B 





0 - 500 5 3 8  
500 - 1000 71 21 92  
1000 - 1500 43 22 65  
1500 - 2000 21 14 35  
2000 - 2500 4 6 10  
+ 2500 2 3 5  
 146 69 215 
 
Table 14: Number of people with WTP below 25 000 in each income group  





of valid answers (366). This means that the information gathered is biased and is only relevant 
as a starting point for a reliable and well-founded conclusion later. 
4. Theoretical Background  
In this section we introduce the methodology that allows us to answer the research question 
of this work project, namely, if when purchasing electric vehicles the state subsidies are granted 
to the “right” consumers, that is, to those that would not buy them otherwise (Literature Review, 
section 2.1).  In other words, we are concerned about additionality. If the resources are granted 
to those that would buy those cars anyway, then resources are being misallocated with negative 
impact on welfare. Since resources are scarce, the opportunity cost of misallocating them is 
very high. Moreover, from the public policy perspective that aims to increase the adoption of 
electric vehicles by incentivizing those that would not buy them otherwise, the government is 
reducing the impact of the policy and transferring resources to those that would not need them. 
So, the policy is not cost-effective, and the overall impact of positive externalities is reduced. 
Having this in mind, and from a theoretical perspective, we consider first the consequences of 
implementing subsidies, and then, following Xing et al. (2019), we show how additionality can 
be tracked. 
The figure below illustrates demand and supply curves when the subsidization program is 
put in place. As it is well-known, a specific subsidy on the demand side shifts the demand curve 
upwards by exactly the same amount of the subsidy.1 This occurs, given that for the same 
quantity sold, the willingness to pay of BEVs’ buyers increases by 3 000€ and 2 000€, for 
households and corporations, respectively.  With this shift in the demand curve the new 
equilibrium price (Ps) will be higher than the previous (P1). However, the final price to buyers 
 
1 In addition to specific subsidies there can be ad valorem subsidies which are conceived as a percentage and not 
as a set amount. Given the Portuguese incentive scheme, which grants specific euro amounts to each buyer, it is 





(Pb) will correspond to the selling price (Ps) minus the subsidy granted by the government. 
Therefore, the quantities sold with Ps are larger than with P1. In the end, there is a win-win 
situation for both consumers and producers, as both consumer and producer surplus increase 









Concerning the welfare impacts, the subsidy increases Consumer Surplus by the light blue 
area and Producer Surplus by the red area, corresponding to the government transfers do 
consumers and producers, respectively. The total subsidy cost that is supported by the 
government is the area given by (Ps – Pb) x Q2, that is, areas blue, red and yellow all together. 
Due to the subsidy, there is a Deadweight Loss for society given by yellow area, being one of 
the caveats of subsidies. However, in order to derive the total cost for society resulting from 
BEVs’ adoption the social benefits due to emissions reduction have to be accounted for. By 
subsidizing only electric vehicles’ buyers who otherwise would have bought a carbon emitting 
vehicle, preventing non-additionality, governments are contributing to decrease CO2 emissions. 
 
2 The result would be the same if producers receive the subsidy instead. 
P 
S 
D with subsidy 





Figure 10: Subsidy impact in the market equilibrium 






This spill-over positive effect from subsidization programs also contributes to bring the market 
equilibrium closer to the social optimal. 
Additionality of a BEV subsidy 
Recall that non-additionality corresponds to the percentage of BEVs (in the specific case of 
this work project) that “would have been bought without the subsidy”. If the value is close to 
100%, it means that the subsidy is not an effective policy and it is not encouraging additional 
BEV sales. Based on Xing et al. (2019), and using the same notation as in Fig. 1, we may write 
                              𝑁𝐴(%) =
𝑄(𝑃1)
𝑄(𝑃𝑏)
∗ 100 (=) 𝑁𝐴(%) =  
𝑄1
𝑄2
∗ 100                                                (1) 
 
where NA (%) represents the share of BEVs that would not have been bought without the 
subsidy, that is, “non-additionality”. 
By differentiating (1) with respect to the subsidy, we obtain that the share of BEVs bought 
without the subsidy depends solely on their own-price elasticity of demand, as follows: 






∗ 𝑒𝐷                                                                    (2) 
 








                                                           (3) 
represents the own-price elasticity of demand3. 
 
3 A value between 0 and -1 refers to an inelastic demand, where consumers are not that sensitive to price changes 
(examples of necessity goods like bread and water). If is it is below -1 (from -1 to - ∞) one is facing an elastic 
demand (goods like cars and soft drinks). There can be also extreme cases: perfectly elastic (- ∞) and perfectly 





Concluding, assuming the Law of Demand (e.g., demand is negatively sloped) the higher 
the own-price elasticity of demand for BEVs (in absolute value), the more effective the subsidy 
is in encouraging consumers that, without the subsidization program, would have not been 
willing to pay for a BEV.  
5. Data and Simulations’ Methodology 
In order to illustrate our claim, and since an econometric study was ruled out given that we 
could not obtain the data that would have allowed to perform it, together with the pandemic 
which has prevented us to conduct a reliable and unbiased survey, we have decided to use 
estimated own-price elasticities of demand obtained from the literature to run a few simulations.  
First, it is relevant to describe some relevant data from the market provided by the 
Associação Automóvel de Portugal (ACAP). This institution statistics registers the number of 
vehicles sold every month, discriminated by model and energy (diesel, gasoline, NGV, hybrid, 
PHEV or BEV).  
Once asked, ACAP provided the total sales for each year since 2015. In Appendix D there 
are Tables 15 and 16 with all models of BEVs sold between 2015 and 2018. The totals show 
that from 2015 to 2018 there was an exponential increase in sales from 645 to 4073. The number 
of different models sold also rose from 11 to 17, showing a diversification to less pollutant 
vehicles from different car brands.      
By the end of 2019, a new record of BEVs’ sales was established with 6883 units sold. 
Table 17, also in Appendix D, presents not only the sales for each model, but also the respective 
price. The price level data was collected from the website Guia do Automóvel, which provides 
all the technical information regarding a wide variety of car models. The link between 
Price/Brand Model is only possible to undertake for 2019, given that there are no data available 





As detailed in the literature review, subsidies cost-effectiveness depends on the buyers 
which are being encouraged to buy BEVs. The purpose of this section is to quantify the 
influence of the price elasticity of demand on non-additionality. 
The simulations and the graphical analysis below require a demand and supply functions, 
and, therefore, different elasticities referring to different buyers. To simplify, we assume a 
constant elasticity demand function for battery electric vehicles where A is a constant and eD is 
the own-price elasticity of demand: 
𝑄 = 𝐴𝑝𝑒𝐷                                                                                                                           (4) 
One possible method to find A would be to obtain total Q and an average p from Table 6. 
Restricting the sample to the models that cost less than 62 500€ (a requirement to apply for the 
subsidy), we obtain an average price of about 39 035€.  However, this would not be accurate, 
since the quantities sold only reflect the effect of the subsidy in 2019 whilst the price levels do 
not. Given this limitation, A will be assumed to be 1. 
Regarding the supply it is considered a linear function for simplicity: 
  𝑄 = 𝑝                                                                                                                           (5) 
Two different simulations are run. First,  we evaluate whether low income buyers, typically 
more price sensitive (Sheldon et al, 2019; Yang et al., 2019) should be those to be encouraged 
instead of those belonging to the remaining income levels plus corporations, which are expected 
to be less price sensitive. As stated by Zhang et al. (2016), in the case of corporate buyers the 
effects of both prices and incentives “are not as pronounced as with personal buyers”. Then, 
will be assessed the consequences of an increase and decrease of the subsidy amount for the 





The literature present different values for eD which translates the above-mentioned price 
sensitiveness. Xing et al. (2019) estimate a BEV eD equal to -2.751 when considering US sales 
between September 2009 and August 2014. Yan (2018) uses data from 28 European countries 
between 2012 and 2014 and gets -1.3. Zhang et al. (2016) obtain estimates for every BEV brand 
sold in the city of Oslo in Norway, ranging from -0.51 (Nissan) and -81.85 (Ford) for 2011-
2013 sales. Finally, Cirillo et al. (2017) estimate 4 different market elasticities relative to price 
in the American state of Maryland, starting at -1.32 and reaching -1.6. For the purpose of these 
simulations we consider eD= -3 for the most price sensitive group and eD = -1.1 for the higher 
income households and corporations. Within the literature values, these choices appear to be 
reasonable when trying to evaluate the differences in targeting either more or less elastic 
demands. The graphs which the next paragraphs refer to are available in Appendix F. The labels 
Q1, Q2, P1, Ps and Pb represent the same values as in Figure 10. The areas in blue and red 
correspond to changes in consumer surplus and producer surplus respectively, while the yellow 
area is the deadweight loss.  
The numerical values for the quantities and prices before the subsidy implementation, were 
reached by equating the supply and demand curve considering for each consumer group the 
respective own-price elasticity of demand. In order to find the equilibrium price with the 
subsidy, Pb was replaced in the demand function by Ps – 3 and then again both functions were 
equated. This means that in these simulations the initial subsidy amount is equal to 3 units.   
On the one hand, Figure 11 illustrates the case in which the subsidy program has an income 
cap requirement, so that it focus on middle to low income individuals or households. Due to 
their higher price sensitiveness, the own price of elasticity of demand is equal to the -3 value. 
By focusing in such buyers’ group, there is the possibility of capturing more marginal buyers, 
that is, those to which the policy should be targeted. The percentage of non-additionality equals 





On the other hand, Figure 12 refers to the remainder households and corporations. From 
this, we can assume the lower own-price elasticity of demand, -1.1 For comparison reasons the 
subsidy will also be equal to 3 units instead of a smaller amount as occurs in the 2020 
Portuguese subsidization program (3 000€ to households and 2 000€ to corporations). Now 
there will be more buyers that would have bought a BEV regardless of the existence of the 
subsidy. This is translated into a rise in non-additionality from previous 27,43% to 29,99% 
(Table 18 from Appendix E). Even though the difference between the two values is 
considerably small, it corroborates the literature findings that non-additionality is smaller for 
more price sensitive buyers. 
Concerning the welfare effects and the impact in prices, when comparing Figures 12 and 13 
it is possible to witness that the decrease in the equilibrium price (for buyers), before and after 
the subsidy implementation, is higher in the case of the group with a more inelastic price 
elasticity of demand (eD = -1.1). These are the consumers who would have bought a BEV in 
any case given their high willingness to pay. Given this, the effects of positive externalities 
from CO2 emission reductions are lowered and will not compensate as much as they are 
supposed to the Deadweight loss created (yellow area). Once again, by not encouraging the 
group with more marginal buyers, the policy is clearly not cost-effective. 
The above results refer only to differences in buyers’ own-price elasticities for BEVs. But 
what are the effects in non-additionality values when increasing the subsidy from 3 to 5 units 
for example or in case of budget restrictions decreasing it to 2 (as already occurs with 
corporations)? The results for new subsidy quantities and for NA are presented in Tables 19 and 
20 of Appendix E, respectively. Both with a 5- and 2-units subsidy, the NA values are smaller 
for the low-income households, meaning that regardless of the subsidy amount these are the 





a. Policy Recommendations 
Given the above findings, the subsidization program should focus mainly in more price 
sensitive buyers, such as medium to low income consumers through a mandatory presentation 
of the previous year IRS (i.e “Imposto sobre o Rendimento de Pessoas Singulares”) declaration. 
This would decrease the portion of BEVs which would have been bought regardless the 
existence of the incentive. In other words, with the same amount of resources, the subsidy would 
encourage a greater share of buyers who would not afford to buy a battery electric vehicle. 
Concerning corporations, it is acceptable that the Portuguese government, due to budget 
restrictions, decides to set a lower value, reducing the number of applications by companies. 
Moreover, and as detailed in section 3, firms already benefit from large tax incentives, which 
not only decrease the final purchase price, but also result in considerable savings throughout 
the BEV life cycle.  
Finally, the per unit subsidy amount should increase to values closer to the other European 
countries (Figure 13, Appendix F), given that the purchasing price for a BEV is still far from 
what people are willing to pay ( Liu, 2014). Regardless of the subsidy amount, as observed in 
the previous quantitative analysis, the most cost-effective option would be to subsidize low 
income buyers given that their non-additionality percentage is lower than the one corresponding 
to the least price sensitive group. 
6. Conclusion and Discussion 
Environmental concerns are in the 21st century in the core of major debates not only in 
Europe but all around the world. The pursuit of sustainable and environmentally friendly 
options is no longer a matter for a residual portion of consumers, it is for sure a global fight 





With the aim of achieving carbon neutrality, several nations and regions are trying to 
encourage their citizens to buy Electric Vehicles through different tax incentives and subsidies. 
Portugal is not an exception and there is currently a subsidization program focused, not only in 
Battery Electric Vehicles, but also in other fully electric vehicles, such as bikes or motorcycles. 
This program, specifically in what concerns BEVs, was the theme for this thesis. Data 
simulations were implemented to evaluate whether the scheme, as it is set, is effective in 
promoting additionality and preventing non-additionality. Based on Xing et al. (2019) it was 
shown that own-price elasticities of demand are a key factor in determining the percentage of 
BEVs which would have been bought even without the subsidy, that is, non-additionality. 
Even though the non-representativeness and bias of the survey must be taken into account, 
it was possible to point out that within the 215 individuals (disregarding students and who 
preferred not to specify their income range) which WTP is below 25 000€, around 76% 
(165/215 * 100 in Table 14) earn less than 1 500€ per month as net income.  
Concerning simulations’ results, when introducing an income requirement to the program, 
the non-additionality percentage equals is about 27,43% given that it is subsidizing low income 
earners, more price sensitive (eD = -3). However, the 27,43% rises to 29,99% when focusing in 
corporations and higher income households. This means that with the same public expenditures, 
the subsidy design becomes more cost-effective when encouraging buyers with lower income, 
given that in this group there are relatively fewer BEV’s potential buyers obtaining a subsidy 
which they would not need to buy the vehicles. In other words, the subsidy incentivizes the 
marginal buyers that otherwise could not afford to buy an electric vehicle, promoting 
additionality. Therefore, by using the public resources to subsidize those buyers, a net increase 





Therefore, the subsidies should discriminate across buyers by targeting them according to their 
income level. This is in contrast to the current policy followed by the Portuguese Government.  
The graphical analysis represents the result that by subsidizing high income households or 
corporations with a more inelastic own price elasticity of demand for BEVs, the government 
“forces” the decrease of the equilibrium price for a group of consumers whose willingness to 
pay was already above the initial price. Moreover, this decrease in price is even higher than the 
one registered once subsidizing low income households, which are the ones to have a greater 
number of marginal buyers in need for the grant. This again, sends the message that such policy 
is not cost effective, and the predicted environmental positive externalities will not be as strong 
as they are supposed to, so that they can somehow compensate for the deadweight loss presented 
int the yellow area.  
 When answering to the proposed research question we may state, by the abovementioned 
findings, that without any specific requirements besides the 62 500€ price limit, the Portuguese 
subsidization program is not effectively encouraging consumers that are not able to buy a BEV 
without the monetary incentive, the “right consumers”.  
This work project is not exempt from either data or methodology flaws. However, given the 
data available, it is an important starting point for further research in the topic. Ideally, a 
thorough analysis would require a complete database of Portuguese Battery Electric Vehicles 
sales in recent years, also providing information about buyers’ characteristics, such as income, 
gender, age, home location, among others. Without this information and estimates, public 
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2 How old are you? 
a. 20 - 25 
b. 25 - 35 
c. 35 - 45  
d. 45 - 55 
e. 55 - 65 
f.      +65 
   
3 What is your net monthly income (in €)? 
a. I am a student, with no earnings. 
b. 0 – 500 
c. 500 – 1000 
d. 1000 – 1500 
e. 1500 – 2000 
f. 2000 – 2500 
g. + 2500 
4 
Have you ever thought about purchasing a 
Battery Electric Vehicle?  
a. Yes. 
b. No. 
c. I alread owe a BEV. 
5 
What were/would for you the reasons to 
purchase a BEV? 
a. It is a sustainable and 
environmentally friendly option. 
b. Because of the existence of 
governmental subsidies. 
c. For the long-run savings. 
d. All the previous options. 
6 
On average, how many kms do you drive per 
day? 
a. 0 – 20 
b. 20 – 40 
c. 40 – 60 
d. 60 – 80  
e. 80 – 100 
f. 100 – 150 
g. 150 – 200 
f. + 200 






What would you be willing to pay for a BEV 
(in €)? 
a. 15 000 – 20 000 
b. 20 000 – 25 000 
c. 25 000 – 30 000 
d. 30 000 – 35 000 
e. 35 000 – 40 000 
f. 40 000 – 45 000 
g. 45 000 – 50 000 
h. 50 000 – 55 000 
i. 55 000 – 60 000 
j. + 60 000 
8 
Imagine that you have at your disposable two 
similar cars, with the exception that one 
would be an ICE model and the other a BEV. 
How much more would you be willing to pay, 
in order to buy the full electric vehicle (in €)? 
a. 0 
b. 100 – 500 
c. 500 – 1000 
d. 1000 – 2000 
e. 2000 – 3000 
f. + 3000 
9 
Have you ever heard about the 3000€ 






















Source: Own Source 








































































Figure 2: Question 2 results in % terms 
Source: Survey 
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I already owe a BEV.
Figure 4: Question 4 results in % terms 
Source: Survey 
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Figure 6: Question 6 results in % terms 
Source: Survey 


















































Figure 8: Question 8 results in % terms 
Source: Survey 


















Question 2  
Options # of answers 
20 - 25 131 
25 - 35 36 
35 - 45 68 
45 - 55 77 
55 - 65 49 
+ 65 5 
Question 1  







I am a student, with no earnings. 93 
0 - 500 10 
500 - 1000 102 
1000 - 1500 72 
1500 - 2000 49 
2000 - 2500 14 
+ 2500 15 
Prefer not to answer. 11 
Question 4 
Options # of answers 
Yes 201 
No 161 





Because of the existence of governmental 
subsidies. 12 
For the long-run savings. 60 
It is a sustainable and environmentally 
friendly option 139 
All the previous options. 155 
Question 6 
Options # of answers 
0 - 20 143 
20 - 40 90 
40 - 60 60 
60 - 80 30 
80 - 100 18 
100 - 150 10 
150 - 200 7 
+ 200 8 
Table 5: Question 1 results in absolute terms  Table 6: Question 2 results in absolute terms  
Source: Survey 
Source: Survey 
Table 7: Question 3 results in absolute terms  
Table 8: Question 4 results in absolute terms 
Source: Survey 
Source: Survey 



























Options # of answers 
0 56 
100 - 500 43 
500 - 1000 78 
1000 - 2000 102 
2000 - 3000 58 
+ 3000 29 
Question 7 
Options # of answers 
15 000 – 20 000 185 
20 000 - 25 000 101 
25 000 - 30 000 43 
30 000 - 35 000 19 
35 000 - 40 000 4 
40 000 - 45 000 5 
45 000 - 50 000 1 
50 000 - 55 000 1 
55 000 - 60 000 2 
+ 60 000 5 
Question 9 
Options # of answers 
Yes. 103 
No. 263 
Brand Model 2016 2015 
NISSAN LEAF 328 209 
BMW SÉRIE i3 177 128 
RENAULT ZOE 170 153 
KIA SOUL 31 3 
VOLKSWAGEN GOLF 18 15 
MERCEDES-BENZ CLASSE B 14 17 
VOLKSWAGEN UP! 8 22 
PEUGEOT ION 6 58 
CITROËN C-ZERO 2 27 
SMART FORTWO 1 7 
MITSUBISHI I-MIEV 1 6 
Total   756 645 




Table 12: Question 8 results in absolute terms  
Table 13: Question 9 results in absolute terms  
Table 15: Number of BEVs’ models sold in 2015 and 2016  























Brand Model 2018 2017 
NISSAN LEAF 1593 318 
RENAULT ZOE 1305 751 
BMW SÉRIE i3 363 255 
SMART FORTWO 220 90 
CITROËN C-ZERO 159 5 
SMART FORFOUR 126 47 
KIA SOUL 79 60 
HYUNDAI IONIQ 74 24 
VOLKSWAGEN GOLF 55 43 
JAGUAR I-PACE 23 0 
NISSAN e-NV200 18 0 
CITROËN BERLINGO 16 6 
HYUNDAI KAUAI 15 0 
VOLKSWAGEN UP! 14 20 
PEUGEOT PARTNER TEPEE 11 5 
PEUGEOT ION 2 8 
MERCEDES-BENZ CLASSE B 0 8 
Total   4 073 1640 
Brand Model 
# of vehicles 
sold 
Price 
NISSAN LEAF 1662 34 505,20 € 
TESLA MODEL 3 1543 50 905,20 € 
RENAULT ZOE 968 32 245,20 € 
BMW I SÉRIE i3 586 42 100,00 € 
JAGUAR I-PACE 540 81 114,00 € 
HYUNDAI KAUAI 425 39 105,20 € 
SMART FORTWO 249 22 845,00 € 
TESLA MODEL S 243 86 998,90 € 
TESLA MODEL X 193 95 995,20 € 
SMART FORFOUR 158 23 745,00 € 
HYUNDAI IONIQ 101 40 580,20 € 
VOLKSWAGEN GOLF 79 42 816,20 € 
AUDI E-TRON 53 72 740,80 € 
NISSAN e-NV200 34 30 000,00 € 
KIA SOUL 30 48 073,50 € 
MERCEDES-
BENZ 
EQC 8 79 150,00 € 
DS DS 3 CROSSBACK 5 41 300,00 € 
KIA NIRO 2 49 573,50 € 
VOLKSWAGEN UP 2 23 380,10 € 
CITROEN C-ZERO 1 30 646,90 € 
PEUGEOT PARTNER 1 33 809,00 € 
Total  6883  
Table 16: Number of BEVs’ models sold in 2017 and 2018  
Source: ACAP  
Source: ACAP and Guia do Automóvel, 2020  






















 Ps = 3,6495 
P1 = 1 
Pb = 0,6495 
P  
P  
 Ps = 3, 33459 
P1 = 1 
Figure 11: Welfare effects of the 3-unit subsidy in the low-income buyers’ group  
Source: Own Source 
 
 
Figure 12: Welfare effects of the 3-unit subsidy in the high-income households and   
corporations’ group  
Source: Own Source 
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eD -3 -1,1 
Initial quantity 
(Q1) 1 1 
Subsidy 
quantity (Q2) 3,64595 3,33459 







eD -3 -1,1 
Initial quantity 
(Q1) 1 1 
Subsidy 
quantity (Q2) 5,5643 5,22253 







eD -3 -1,1 
Initial quantity 
(Q1) 1 1 
Subsidy 
quantity(Q2) 2,7167 2,44382 
NA 36,81% 40,92% 
Table 18: Quantities and NA with 3-unit subsidy for the 2 buyers’ groups 
Source: Own source 
Source: Own source 
Source: Own source 
Table 19: Quantities and NA with 5-unit subsidy for the 2 buyers’ groups 














Figure 13: BEVs purchase subsidies and scrappage schemes in Europe (as of summer 2020) 
Source: Transport & Environment (2020). Mission (almost) accomplished, page 18 
